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Riassunto 
Questo articolo analizza brevemente uno dei problemi più significativi della Federazione Russa e cioè i conflitti etnici. 
Tale fenomeno assume diverse dimensioni e differenti manifestazioni: dalla discriminazione nell’ambito del mercato 
del lavoro agli eventi estremi della pulizia etnica durante le guerre in Cecenia.  
L’autore focalizza l’attenzione su di un aspetto alla base del problema: l’oppressione strutturale esercitata dalle 
minoranze contro la maggioranza culturale del paese con particolare riferimento alle repubbliche del Caucaso del nord 
ove l’obiettivo e l’intensità della lotta etnica hanno assunto forme assolutamente pericolose ed esplosive in grado di 
minacciare lo stato tramite la sua disgregazione. 
 
Résumé 
Cet article fournit une brève analyse de l’un des problèmes les plus importants de la Fédération Russe, c’est-à-dire les 
conflits ethniques. Ce phénomène se manifeste de plusieurs manières  : de la discrimination dans le marché du travail 
aux événements extrêmes du nettoyage ethnique pendant les guerres en Tchétchénie. 
L’auteur s’intéresse à l’un des aspects du problème jusque-là inexploré : l’oppression structurelle exercée par les 
minorités ethniques  contre les communautés majoritaires du pays et en particulier le cas des républiques du Caucase du 
Nord où la portée et l’intensité des conflits ethniques ont présenté les formes les plus dangereuses et extrêmes pouvant 
menacer l’état  par sa désintégration.    
 
Abstract 
This paper represents the brief analysis of one of the most important problems of the Russian Federation – the ethnic 
conflicts. Such a phenomenon has various dimensions and manifestations: from discrimination on the labor market to 
the extreme of ethnic cleansing during wars in Chechnya. The author focuses on the previously unexplored side of the 
problem: structural oppression conducted by minorities against the cultural majority of the country with a special regard 
to the republics of North Caucasus where the scope and intensity of ethnic strife found the most dangerous and 
explosive forms threatening with disintegration of the state. 
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1. Introduction. Soviet legacy of ‘ethnic 
engineering’. 
An ambitious revolutionary project set up by the 
Bolsheviks and continued by the Soviet 
government was not limited to the political 
dimension solely. Trapped with the need to pacify 
and unite an amalgam of cultural and religious 
groups of population (400 ethnic groups identified 
in the 1989), from Estonian Lutherans to Yakut 
Animists, the new rulers spent decades trying to 
solve these tasks1. Among many theoretical 
constructs brought to life there were two most 
relevant for the purpose of this article: reified 
ethnicity and the ‘titular’ concept.  
Ethnic status was reified through the state 
machinery: from the ethnic attachment in the 
internal passport2 (one had to choose an ethnic 
origin from a limited list of options) to the ethnic 
quotas in the universities and armed forces, thus 
becoming an essential attribute of any Soviet 
citizen.  Official ethnological studies3 were based 
on Marxist ideas combined with primordial theory 
(ethnicity is archaic, fixed and unchanging). In 
society ethnicity was roughly understood in most 
common terms: physical appearance and/or 
distinctive language. This simplified kind of 
understanding still persists in the nowadays 
Russian Federation while the author of this article 
                                                          
1
 Martin T., Suny R.G. (eds.), A State of Nations: 
Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and 
Stalin, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001; 
Kadio Zh., Laboratoriia imperii: Rossiia / SSSR, 1860-
1940, Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, Moskva, 2010, pp. 
148–267; Marshall A., The Caucasus under Soviet 
Rule, Routledge, London, 2010, pp. 147–243. 
2
 Interestingly the chosen ethnic origin in the passport 
not always coincided with the ethnic origin stated in 
the Communist Party member card. The Party had its 
own rules of self-identification and allowed politically 
secure “ethnic passing”. 
3
 The seminal work: Bromlei Iu.V., Etnos i etnografiia, 
Nauka, Moskva, 1973. 
tend to analyze ethnicity as a social construct and 
more like an ethnic identification than a fixed 
identity.  
The ‘titular’ status reflected the Soviet policy of 
positive discrimination: many ethnic groups 
“oppressed by the Tsarist regime” were promoted 
by the new revolutionary authorities in nearly 
every aspect of social life – mostly using politics 
of indigenization (until late 1930-s)4. Such a 
group was usually designated as ‘titular’ – i.e. 
having “special ethnic rights” for the certain 
territory, financial support, various social benefits 
and focused state care. From the legal point of 
view it is difficult to define ‘titular’ with 
mathematical precision and this term will receive 
a detailed explanation throughout the article. In 
the framework of political science and social 
anthropology ‘titular’ could be defined as “an 
ethnic minority privileged by the state on the 
expense of other groups”.  
Paradoxically this uneven treatment of Soviet 
citizens favoring ‘titular’ minorities5 co-existed 
with the concept of “friendship of peoples” which 
declared color-blind equality of all Soviet (and 
non-Soviet) people6. After the dissolution of the 
USSR the “friendship of peoples” has obviously 
disappeared after numerous armed ethnic conflicts 
but the deeply-embedded system of ‘titular’ 
privileges still goes on bringing about dangerous 
                                                          
4
 Martin T., Imperiia “polozhitel'noi deiatel'nosti”. 
Natsii i natsionalizm v SSSR, 1923–1939, ROSSPEN, 
Moskva, 2011. On the later period, including postwar 
ethnic turn see: Blitstein P.A., Stalin's Nations: Soviet 
Nationality Policy between Planning and 
Primordialism, 1936–1953, Ph.D., University of 
California, Berkeley, Fall 1999. 
5
 Hosking D., Praviteli i zhertvy. Russkie v Sovetskom 
Soiuze, Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, Moskva, 2012. 
6
 A classical analysis of this contradiction: Slezkine Y., 
“The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a 
Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism”, Slavic 
Review, Vol. 53, No.2, Summer 1994, pp. 414–452. 
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and painful problems. Ethnic tensions took place 
in Soviet Union as well but only as incidental, 
short-lived and isolated events7 while after 1989 
ethnic discrimination and ethnic conflicts were 
unleashed on a nationwide scale8 especially in the 
region of Northern Caucasus9.  
 
2. Silent apartheid. 
Analyzing vectors and dynamics of discrimination 
in the Russian Federation (RF), it is worth paying 
attention on peculiar “vow of silence” of the 
academic and human rights communities 
concerning a situation in some “ethnic” subjects 
of the state. This long-term (and politically 
caused) omertà was broken by rather recently 
when situation in the specified regions of Russia 
on many parameters became critical. And, it is 
                                                          
7
 Laitin D.D., “The National Uprisings in the Soviet 
Union”, World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 1, October, 1991, 
pp. 139–177. Kozlov V.A.,  Neizvestnyi SSSR. 
Protivostoianie naroda i vlasti 1953–1985, Olma-
Press, Moskva, 2006, pp. 187–233. Hale H.E., The 
Foundations of Ethnic Politics – Separatism of States 
and Nations in Eurasia and the World, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2008, pp. 93–118. On 
dissident ethnic networks in the post-Stalin USSR see 
e.g.: Alekseeva L., Istoriia inakomysliia v SSSR. 
Noveishii period, ZAO RITS, Moskva, 2001, pp. 7–
122; Zisserman-Brodsky D., Constructing 
Ethnopolitics in the Soviet Union: Samizdat, 
Deprivation and the Rise of Ethnic Nationalism, 
Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003, pp. 111–147. 
8
 Beissinger M.R., “Nationalist Violence and the State: 
Political Authority and Contentious Repertoires in the 
Former USSR”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 30, No. 4, 
July, 1998, pp. 401–422; Semionova E., Na etnicheskoi 
voine… (Genotsid  russkikh v byvshikh respublikakh 
SSSR), Traditsiia, Moskva, 2010. 
9
 “Relationships between nations and ethnic groups in 
the Caucasus throughout history have been extremely 
complicated, in many cases quite tense, if not outright 
hostile. Ancient feuds and land disputes abound in 
many regions. Under the Soviet regime, old passions 
were held in check by the tight control of Moscow 
authorities. Now, old grievances and latent animosities 
have surfaced, and the Caucasus has become one huge 
area of instability”. Mirsky G.I., On Ruins of Empire – 
Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Former Soviet Union, 
Greenwood Press, Westport, 1997, p. 61. 
represented that studying of the specified problem 
needs to start with the cornerstone of political 
architecture defining development and the 
direction of public and administrative processes in 
a number of territorial subjects of the RF, with 
concept of “the titular nation”. So-called “the 
titular people”, “the titular nation” or “the state-
building people” – concepts little-known the 
Western scientists10 and absolutely alien to the 
language of international law11 (most 
approximately “titular” can be translated as ethnic 
seniority/superiority). But after disintegration of 
the Soviet Union, the term “titular nation” which 
is formally designating “native/dominating” 
population of the republics of the RF, began to 
mark not only a form of the social capital, but also 
a peculiar right to the legalized discrimination 
concerning “not titular” fellow citizens.  
In texts of republican constitutions (“infused with 
the spirit of secessionism”12) there is no definition 
of “the titular nation”, but it is successfully 
                                                          
10
 In the Western researches the titular status 
[titul’nost’] is used as the specific term, relevant only 
for the former Soviet Union.  See e.g. Locher L., 
“Migration in the Soviet Successor States”, IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 602, Institute for the Study of 
Labor, Bonn, October 2002; Hazans M.,   
Trapeznikova I.,   Rastrigina O., “Ethnic and Parental 
Effects on Schooling Outcomes before and During the 
Transition:  Evidence from the Baltic Countries”, 
Journal of Population Economics, Vol. 21, No. 3, 
2008, pp. 719–494; Smith B., Separatist Conflict in 
Eurasia and Beyond: Exploring Communist Bloc 
Exceptionalism, Annual Meeting Paper, American 
Political Science Association, Washington, 2010; 
Gruzina I., “Relationship between History and a Sense 
of Belonging – Russian Speaking Minority Integration 
in Latvia”, CEU Political Science Journal, Vol.  6, No.  
3, 2011, pp.  397–432. 
11
 Sokolovskii S., “Kontseptualizatsiia etnicheskogo v 
rossiiskom konstitutsionnom prave”, In Voronkov V., 
O. Karpenko O., Osipov A. (eds.), Rasizm v iazyke 
sotsial'nykh nauk, Aleteiia, Sankt Peterburg, 2002, p. 
99. 
12
 Sharlet R., “Russian Constitutional Crisis: Law and 
Politics under Yel’tsin”, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 9, 
No. 4, October–December 1993, p. 321. 
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replaced in some cases by such combinations as 
“the native nation” and “native ethnos”13. As all 
former Soviet republics are formed on the 
doubtful “ethnic” principle, they represent only 
radical ethnocracies14 with a claim for a 
democratic mode. But the situation in Russia is an 
exception, because despite the constitutional 
principle of equality of all citizens before the law, 
existence of special “unlawful” regions – the 
republics and autonomies (making more than a 
half of the territory of the country) where titular 
Russians “are more equal than others”, transforms 
the country in a kind of confederative archipelago 
composed from the separate subjects allocated 
with different status and rights. In the words of 
Ben Fowkes: “a hierarchy of autonomies (such as 
existed also in the Soviet Union) with places like 
Tatarstan at the top, enjoying very far-reaching 
autonomy, and with the purely Russian provinces 
at the bottom”15. One of the examples is a steady 
dictatorship of “ethnic legal personality”. Only 
“titular” persons have the right to hold positions in 
local administrations and parliaments: for 
example, in the Republic of Adygea “not titular” 
citizens (Russian Slavs) constitute nearly 60% of 
population but representatives of “the titular 
nation” hold practically all leading posts and 
places in legislature16. 
It is extremely difficult for “not titular” citizens to 
be engaged in business, to get appointed/elected in 
republican bodies of power and even to live in the 
                                                          
13
 Sokolovskii S., op. cit., pp. 94–117. 
14
  See in detail: Toshchenko Zh.T., Etnokratiia: 
istoriia i sovremennost' (sotsiologicheskie ocherki), 
ROSSPEN, Moskva, 2003. 
15
 Fowkes B., Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in the Post-
Communist World, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 
2002, p. 147. 
respective territory17. Thus “today the all-Russian, 
Petersburg, Moscow elite of business and the 
power it is obvious not ethnocratic18”, unlike their 
‘colleagues’ form North Caucasus. Like that, in 
titular territories many citizens are deprived of the 
political, civil, economic and social rights. The 
subject of a separate research is the discrimination 
of “not titular” population at receipt in higher 
education institutions. These discriminatory 
practices having institutional character and 
conducting to a unofficial ghettoization of the 
Russian population is possible to characterize as a 
soft regional apartheid. “Titular citizens” 
supervise not only authorities, but also posses all 
infrastructure while having no relation to its 
establishment. Here it should be noted that exactly 
“not titular” specialist built plants and factories, 
developed agriculture, created the metalworking 
enterprises, food, timber and wood-working 
industry. It is necessary to add that all scientific 
institutions in the Caucasus – from agricultural 
experimental stations to universities are an 
exclusive contribution of “not titular” experts.  
Situation is aggravated with that the “titular” 
territories striving for the de facto economic and 
political sovereignty, in the majority appear to be 
depressive regions-recipients while many Russian 
donor regions, on the economic, demographic, 
social and intellectual potential repeatedly 
surpassing republics, have rather low political 
                                                                                          
16
 Polubota A., “Russkikh vydavlivaiut iz Adygei, 
chtoby sozdat' «Velikuiu Cherkesiiu»”, Svobodnaia 
pressa, 25.11.2012. 
17
 Kazenin K., «Tikhie» konflikty na Severnom 
Kavkaze: Adygeia, Kabardino-Balkariia, Karachaevo-
Cherkesiia, REGNUM, Moskva, 2009, pp. 13–55. 
18
 Arutiunov S., “Etnokratiia ili demokratiia? Traditsii 
Severnogo Kavkaza”, In Traditsii narodnoi diplomatii i 
normy povedeniia vo vremia voiny i konfliktov na 
Kavkaze, Kavkazskii Forum NPO, Tsakhkadzor, 31.05. 
– 2.06.2001. 
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status and are restrained in their possibilities19. In 
such a paradoxical way discrimination of “not 
titular” population is also sponsored by the federal 
center.  
The cultural and linguistic majority making more 
than eighty two percent of the population, in many 
regions of Russia is declared “not titular” and 
contrary to the Constitution of the RF is exposed 
to a discrimination on ethnic and language basis20. 
Thus, in legal sense, “titular” regions of the RF 
represent the encapsulated ethnic territories. In 
this regard a set of measures for elimination 
suppression concerning migrants (which number 
steadily grows in legal regions) has to be added 
with drastic measures on the termination of 
institutional discrimination of “not titular” 
population (which number, for example, in the 
North Caucasus, is steadily declining21) in ethnic 
territorial subjects of the RF.  
 
3. Separatists’ ethnic cleansing and 
administrative dereliction. 
Such discrimination got an extreme form in the 
Chechen republic in the late eighties – the 
beginning of the nineties. Many graffiti targeting 
non-titular citizens of Chechnya like: “Russians 
[go] to Riazan, Tatars to Kazan, Ingush to 
Nazran!22” could be seen in Chechen cities and 
                                                          
19
 Filippov V.R., “Etnopoliticheskie paradoksy i krizis 
rossiiskogo federalizma”, In Ismagilova R.N., Filippov 
N.R. (eds.), Federalizm i regional'naia politika v 
polietnichnykh gosudarstvakh, XXI Vek-Soglasie, 
Moskva, 2001, pp. 23–38. 
20
 Filippov V.R., Op. cit., pp. 30–35. 
21
 Vladimirov A., “How many Russians are left in 
Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia?”, Vestnik 
Kavkaza, 3.05.2010. 
22
 Riazan’ is a city generally and wrongly considered to 
be ancestral home of all Russian Slavs. Kazan’ is the 
capital of Republic of Tatarstan. Nazran’ was the 
capital of Republic of Ingushetia until December 2000. 
villages23. Other messages were more specific: on 
memoirs of inhabitants of Grozny (the capital of 
Chechnya), the most popular slogan of those years 
sounded as follows: “Russians do not leave – we 
need slaves and prostitutes”. Since 1989 the hate-
motivated crimes: robberies, beatings, 
kidnappings24, gang-rapes25 and public murders of 
persons of Slavic and other non-Chechen origin 
steadily gained scope of the organized terror26 
under liberal accompaniment of “parade of 
sovereignties” and indifference of the democratic 
government of Boris Yeltsin. 
Here it is necessary to emphasize, that not all 
‘titular’ inhabitants of Chechnya took part in this 
terror: it was encouraged by Jokhar Dudayev’s 
warlords and supported by sympathizing Islamists 
and separatists, marginal youth, and also the 
criminals let out from prisons. But also the 
numerous facts of murders of the Russian families 
                                                          
23
 Sokirianskaia E., “Ideology and conflict: Chechen 
Political Nationalism Prior to, and During, Ten Years 
of War”, In Gammer M. (ed.), Ethno-Nationalism, 
Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet 
Disorder, Routledge, New York, 2008, p. 116.   
24
 About the Chechen “culture” of hostage-taking see: 
Tishkov V.A., Chechnya: Life in a War-torn Society, 
University of California Press, Los Angeles, 2004, pp. 
107–126. Consider historical description of Chechen 
territories: “travelers with no bona fide hosts were 
considered as hostile and were usually taken as 
prisoners or slaves” Jaimoukha A., The Chechens: a 
Handbook (Caucasus World, Peoples of the Caucasus), 
Routledge, New York, 2005, p. 142. 
25
 Rape has been frequently used in various conflicts as 
a symbolical tool of domination over oppressed 
population of other ethnic origin when conditions 
guarantee anonymity and impunity of perpetrators: 
Thornhill R., Palmer T.C., A Natural History of Rape: 
Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, 2000, pp. 66, 134, 194. See in details: 
Sharlach L.B., Sexual Violence as Political Terror, 
Ph.D., University of California, Davis, September 
2001, pp. 157–253; Herzog D. (ed.), Brutality and 
Desire: War and Sexuality in Europe's Twentieth 
Century, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2009.  
26
 Bugai N.F., Russkie na Severnom Kavkaze: 
sotsial'noe polozhenie, transformatsii etnicheskoi 
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by their ordinary Chechen next-door neighbors 
with whom “not titular” families lived in peace for 
decades were recorded27. In total some tens of 
thousands of Russians were killed (not including 
victims during military operations) and more than 
46 thousand Russian-speaking citizens were 
turned into slaves28. Ethnic cleanings committed 
by Chechen separatists targeted also other 
representatives of not “titular” groups of the 
population: Jews29, Armenians, Greeks, Tatars, 
Roma people. These tragic events for years were 
suppressed by mass media. But during the First 
Chechen campaign many Russian journalists 
romanticized the separatists, creating image of the 
“noble rebel” which has not occasionally 
coincided with the plans of Chechen propaganda. 
For example, prominent Russian scientist V.A. 
Tishkov after conducting field researches in 
Chechnya gave the following assessment to 
actions of a film crew of NTV Broadcasting 
Company: “Elena Masyuk and Pavel Luskanov’s 
reportings won on the party of the Chechen 
combatants for the whole [army] division”30.  
Only in July, 2000 the federal authorities admitted 
the fact of ethnic cleansing of the Russian 
population. In interview to the French weekly 
                                                                                          
obshchnosti (1990-e gody — nachalo XXI veka), Grif i 
K, Moskva, 2011, pp. 210–225. 
27
 Sokolov-Mitrich D., “Zabytyi genotsid”, Izvestiia, 
28.01.2005. See also: Esses V.M., Vernon R.A. (eds.), 
Explaining the Breakdown of Ethnic Relations: Why 
Neighbors Kill, Blackwell Publishing, Malden, 2008. 
28
 Bondarenko M., “Kazaki Chechni ishchut zashchity 
u Vladimira Putina. Vytesnenie russkogo naselenia v 
respublike prodolzhaetsia pri popustitel'stve 
federal'nykh chinovnikov”, Nezavisimaia gazeta, 
23.05.2003. 
29
 About Chechen anti-Semitism incited under the 
influence of radical Islamism and a pro-Arab 
orientation see: Tishkov V. A., Op. cit., pp. 207–209. 
30
 Tishkov V.A.,  Obshchestvo v Vooruzhennom 
Konflikte: Etnografiia Chechenskoi Voiny, Nauka, 
Moskva, 2001, p. 181.  
Paris Match the president of Russia Vladimir 
Putin declared: “In recent years in the territory of 
Chechnya we observed large-scale genocide 
concerning the Russian people, concerning the 
Russian-speaking population. Unfortunately, 
nobody reacted to it. Nobody reacted even to the 
attacks on the Russian territory which were 
carried out all these years. The authorities did not 
react to mass kidnappings”31. In this statement the 
phrase “we observed” is remarkable – it means 
that authorities well knew about events taking 
place in Chechnya. It is characteristic that “in 
recent years” V. Putin served as the director of 
Federal Security Service and then as a head of the 
government of the RF. Why genocide supervision 
from such a high-ranking official was not beyond 
philosophical contemplation and for what reason 
“nobody reacted” in the state apparatus under his 
control remains unclear. 
In 2002 V. Putin declared that in “result of ethnic 
cleanings in Chechnya up to 30 thousand people 
perished, and possibly even more”. “This will 
never happen again”, – added the head of the 
state32. Certainly that this political declaration was 
not followed by real actions on investigation and 
accountability of the perpetrators. Investigation 
teams and groups of experts were not formed; the 
permanent commission on investigation of acts of 
genocide concerning the Russian population in the 
Chechen Republic was not established in the 
federal parliament. This absence of political will 
is especially strange given that the RF is obliged 
to fulfill certain international obligations. 
                                                          
31
 V. Putin’s interview to the French weekly magazine 
Paris Match on 06.07.2000 Available at: 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/appears/2000/07/06/0000_typ
e63379_125007.shtml  
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Authorities have to provide effective protection of 
citizens from racially motivated attacks even from 
unofficial persons, prevent similar manifestations 
of aggression, consistently make independent and 
effective investigation in case of committing such 
crimes. The International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
clearly obliges the signatory states to take all 
appropriate measures directed on prohibition and 
elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, 
carried out by any persons, groups or the 
organizations, including and protection of persons 
against violence or causing injuries from informal 
persons. The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights demands to provide protection of 
the right not to be exposed to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment even from the 
persons acting in their personal quality. Not 
casually the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment establishes responsibility of the state 
for the acts of torture made “with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity”. Therefore, the 
unwillingness of the state to provide protection 
from racially motivated violence can be 
interpreted as criminal negligence of government 
bodies and indulgence to carrying out tortures. 
The precedents of independent and effective 
investigation of such discrimination are available. 
In the decision of November 21, 2002 UN 
Committee against Torture held that the burning 
down of Roma houses by a mob of non-Roma 
neighbours in 14th of April 1995 constituted an act 
of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The 
                                                                                          
32
 Vladimir Putin: Rossiia ne poidet na peregovory s 
banditami i terroristami v Chechne, 19.12.2002. 
Available at: http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=16758   
failure of the police authorities to take appropriate 
steps to protect the Roma amounted to 
acquiescence to these acts, since the police 
authorities were informed of the immediate risk 
facing the Roma and were even present at the 
scene of events – thus Article 16 of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination was violated33. 
Ethnic cleansing of “not titular” population of 
Chechnya as well continued in 1995 and nothing 
prevents Russian NGOs to provide legal support 
to the survivors to appeal to the international 
organizations but for the unclear reasons it still 
does not take place. Moreover, there is no consent 
concerning the recognition of ethnic cleansing. 
For example, the Chechen researchers do not 
agree with this assessment. In particular, the 
editor of the Groznenskoe Obshchestvo [Grozny 
Society] newspaper T. Aliyev considers that no 
genocide and even ethnic cleansings took place, 
evidences of the forcefully displaced Russian are 
fictions, and a mass exodus of non-Chechens from 
this republic before the war34 happened without 
any particular reason35. However, the same 
attitude is widely promoted in other editions of 
Chechens: Vainakh, Orga, Dosh – typical samples 
of journalism of ethnic offenses and revanshism. 
By the way, Dosh is the quarterly magazine with a 
circulation of 5000 copies. In this regard it is 
important to underline that the Chechen Diaspora 
in Moscow makes about 300 thousand people, 
                                                          
33
 Hajrizi Dzemajl et al. v. Yugoslavia, 21 November 
2002. (Case No. 161/1999) UN Doc. 
CAT/C/29/D/161/2000. 
34
 Sokirianskaia E., Op. cit., p. 116. 
35
 Aliev T., “Iskhod russkikh iz Chechni”, Polit.Ru, 
17.12.2007.  Available at: 
http://polit.ru/research/2007/12/17/escape.html   
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constantly increases and remains one of the most 
criminalized36 and influential in the capital.  
 
4. Subsidized oppression in other republics. 
Unfortunately, in recent years the Republic of 
Ingushetia became a sad model of pushing out the 
persons of “not titular” origin with the methods 
which are not leaving any doubt in intention of the 
criminals. Addressed arsons, tossing of explosive 
devices and demonstrative murders are typical 
hate crimes justified and directed by “titular” 
status37. According to the Human rights center 
“Memorial” only during the period from July 16 
to November 12, 2007 twenty four persons of not 
titular origin were murdered in Republic of 
Ingushetia: Russians, Armenians, Roma and 
Koreans38. The expert of “Memorial” notes: 
“These murders and attacks are a part of system 
pressure upon the non-Vainakh population of the 
republic”39. It is indicative that precipitancy of 
flight from this republic long before the beginning 
of “titular terror” looks amazing even on the 
general background of an outcome of “not titular 
citizens”. In 1989 Russians constituted 13, 2% of 
                                                          
36
 Chechens’ criminal impact after 1989 is described by 
one of the Western scholars in the following words: “In 
Moscow and other major cities, a powerful Chechen 
Mafia shaped up. [t]heir share in criminal activities in 
Russia has by far exceeded their proportion in the 
population. According to official data, one of every 
three people charged with counterfeiting has been a 
former resident of Chechnya, as well as 42% of the 
persons involved in embezzlement and machinations in 
the sphere of finances and credit operations. The 
protection racket was thriving, murders and 
kidnappings became a regular feature of life.” Mirsky 
G.I., Op. cit., p. 84. 
37
 The continuous chronicle of 2006–2014 terrorist 
acts, shootings and kidnappings: Ingushetiia: khronika 
teraktov, obstrelov, pokhishchenii. Available at: 
http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/122475  
38
 Ingushetiia:  2007 god. Kuda dal'shche?, Memorial, 
Moskva, 2008, pp. 17–19. 
39
 Ibid. 
the population of Ingushetia40 and in 2010 there 
were only 0,7% of them left41. It is obvious that 
the situation was extremely intense all these years 
and now only reached an extreme point42.  
In Dagestan – “an overwhelmingly Muslim, and 
overwhelmingly non-Russian, republic43” – there 
is an amalgam of “titular” groups44 and 
languages45 with a slight prevailing of Avars (27, 
5 percent of the population). In this largest 
republic of the North Caucasus (2,5 million of 
inhabitants) replacement of the Russian 
population happens not so considerably46, but 
ethnic profiling targeting Slavic people and 
dismissals on the basis of a “non-titular” origin 
accompanied with house racketeering helped to 
expel Russian inhabitants from the areas of 
traditional accommodation of the Slavic 
population – Kizlyar and Tarumovsky disctricts. 
The derussification occurred also in the 
multicultural city of Khasavyurt. This city became 
widely known in 1993 after the act of symbolical 
violence when ‘titular’ activists desecrated a 
Christian cemetery and using an excavator dug 
                                                          
40
 Belozerov V., Еtnicheskaia karta Severnogo 
Kavkaza, OGI, Moskva, 2005. p. 247. 
41
 Data provided according to the All-Russian 
population census of 2010 [Section 4. “Population by 
ethnic origin”]. Available at: 
http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc
/Documents/Vol4/pub-04-04.pdf  
42
 According to the journalist and specialist in 
Caucasian studies O. Alenova: “The last Russians 
escape from Ingushetia. The situation there is now 
worse, than it was in Chechnya before the war. But 
nobody wants to restore order as it was made in due 
time in Chechnya”. Alenova O., Chechnia riadom. 
Voina glazami zhenshchiny, ID «Kommersant», ID 
«Piter», Moskva, Sankt Peterburg, 2008, p. 450.   
43
 Fowkes B., Op. cit., p. 147. 
44
 But only 14 largest groups are presented in the State 
Council of Republic of Dagestan.  
45
 Inhabitants of this republic speak twenty-six 
different languages and tens of local dialects. 
46
 In fact unofficial practice of pushing out non-titular 
citizens was observed already in 1960-s. 
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out coffins with deceased47. Similar tactics is 
applied in the republican capital Makhachkala and 
the ancient city of Derbent therefore the total 
number of the Russian population in Dagestan 
was reduced with twelve to four percent (about 
80-90 thousand people). Remained became object 
of labor and household discrimination, 
representing the cheap service personnel which is 
completely dependent on a whim not only of a 
local government but also ordinary “titular” 
neighbors. Moreover, among these four percent 
mutual suspiciousness and informing with the 
purpose to avoid possible repressive measures are 
spread. Deputy head of the Makhachkala 
Commission on problems of Russians (sic!) 
Abdurakhman Guseinov frankly says that “in the 
mid-nineties Russians were simply kicked out out 
from their houses or were forced to sell them at 
the ridiculous price”48. Traditions of a resolution 
of conflicts looked as follows: “For example, at 
banal car accident, even a minor one, the crowd of 
friends of the injured dzhigit [here – male “titular” 
person] immediately arrived (that he was not 
guilty was not discussed at all) and Russian was 
given the car keys with words: “Take this [car] 
away, I do not need it, tomorrow you will bring 
me a new one!”49 It is quite obvious that 
authorities and public organizations had to pay 
attention to this scandalous discrimination of the 
Russian population – it is enough to imagine the 
reaction of the state and human rights NGOs on 
hypothetical exile of the Dagestan Diaspora from 
                                                          
47
 Karpov Iu.Iu., Kapustina E.L., Gortsy posle gor. 
Migratsionnye protsessy v Dagestane v XX – nachale 
XXI veka: ikh sotsial'nye i etnokul'turnye posledstviia i 
perspektivy, Peterburgskoe Vostokovedenie, Sankt 
Peterburg, 2011, p. 292.  
48
 Kots A., Steshin D., “Vernutsia li russkie na 
Kavkaz?”, Komsomol'skaia pravda, 07.06.2006.   
49
 Ibid. 
Moscow. But, consider an opinion of a well-
known historian who has conducted scientific 
researches in Dagestan for many years, “federal 
programs keep silence about mass flight [italics 
added] of Russians from this region to the Central 
and the Southern Russia and Mountainous Jews to 
Israel”50. 
These programs had been crafted for financial 
support of the Dagestan sportsmen and material 
security of the unemployed and unwilling to work 
population of a “titular” origin.  But gradually 
Dagestan neo-tribalism gains character of a direct 
political challenge to the federal center.  So, in 
February, 2009 Vladimir Radchenko, the new 
chief of the department of Federal Tax Service in 
Dagestan could not start fulfillment of his duty in 
Makhachkala because of aggressive local 
counteraction to its appointment. V. Radchenko's 
ethnic [Russian] origin did not suit ruling circles 
of Republic of Dagestan that caused the planned 
actions of “a national protest”, the false report on 
prepared explosion in the building of the 
republican office of the Federal Tax Service, 
threats of homicide and in the end – the 
kidnapping of Mr. Radchenko with the use of 
firearms51. It is worth emphasizing that the high-
ranking federal official underwent such a 
treatment. The reaction of Kremlin did not follow 
and Mr. Radchenko was recalled back to Moscow. 
Thus, the informal contract of the federal center 
with the republican “elite” (ostentatious loyalty 
                                                          
50
 Bobrovnikov V., “Islamofobiia i religioznoe 
zakonodatel'stvo v postsovetskom Dagestane”, In 
Aleksandrov Iu.G. (ed.), Еtnicheskii natsionalizm i 
gosudarstvennoe stroitel'stvo, Institut vostokovedeniia 
RAN, Natalis, Moskva, 2001, p. 250. 
51
 On “Radchenko affair” see e.g. Ionov O., 
“Radchenko shchitaet, chto za ego pokhishcheniem 
stoit syn prezidenta Dagestana”, Kavkazskii uzel, 
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and the necessary counting of votes on elections 
in exchange for federal subventions and 
inviolability) received the next – the extremely 
convincing confirmation. Certainly that the 
similar configuration of ‘division of powers’ takes 
place not only in Dagestan but in all republics of 
the North Caucasus. Herewith, subsidized North 
Caucasian clans become more and more isolated – 
both from Moscow, and from the population in 
the regions. It is important to stress that federal 
subsidies do not reach ordinary citizens and 
become a basis of illegal enrichment of the ‘pro-
Kremlin’ ruling circles. Moreover, the ruling clans 
usurp access in executive, judicial and legislative 
branches of power; business and the sphere of the 
higher education which inevitably blocks all 
channels of vertical mobility especially for the 
North Caucasian youth. As a result, inhabitants 
are compelled to migrate to other (non Caucasian) 
regions, to look for an exit in extreme nationalism 
or to choose a ‘religious approved’ way of the 
armed violence under the leadership of the foreign 
Muslim instructors that leads to tens killed and 
wounded every week52. 
 
 
                                                                                          
09.02.2009; Poliakov S., “Lezginka pod dulom 
pistoleta”, Komsomol'skaia pravda, 13.02.2009. 
52
 According to Grigorii Shvedov the editor-in-chief of 
“Caucasian Knot” news agency Dagestan is captured 
by civil war. The situation in this republic is the most 
intense. In 2011 in Dagestan violence growth was 
observed again:  total number of victims of the conflict 
raised up to 824 persons, from them 413 got killed and 
411 got wounded.  (In 2010 the number of victims was 
685 persons, of them 378 killed and 307 wounded)  
See:  Shvedov G., Malashenko A., Severnyi Kavkaz: 
itogi 2011 goda, Moskovskii Тsentr Karnegi, Moskva, 
19.03.2012. Available at: 
http://carnegie.ru/events/?fa=3667 Weekly statistics on 
victims of violent struggle in North Caucasus is 
available at http://voinenet.ru/voina/ezhenedelnye-
hroniki/ 
5. “Titular” framework and defining. 
Addressing the history of migratory processes, it 
is necessary to notice that replacement of “not 
titular” population from the republics of 
Transcaucasia and autonomies of the North 
Caucasus began in Soviet period and lasted 
decades. And after disintegration of the USSR this 
process only sharply amplified53. And 
derussification process in the Caucasian region 
went with much higher intensity, than in any other 
territory of the country54. Moreover, as a result of 
rash administrative-territorial transformations a 
number of the Russian areas become a part of the 
North Caucasian republics. Thus the indigenous 
Russian people in national autonomies underwent 
pressure and the discrimination considerably 
surpassing that test on itself ethnically ‘other’ in 
regions of Russian Ciscaucasia55. And the 
expelled population is exposed to powerful 
processes of desocialization and marginalization: 
it was literally pushed out of society. It is 
necessary to underline that most actively “titular 
rights” are used and reproduced by the criminal 
(religious, extremist, separatist, politically active) 
part of certain cultural and linguistic group. 
Certainly, if this group has “the ethnic ownership” 
of a certain territory, resources, the constitution, 
quasi-state attributes, the paramilitary structures. 
Unfortunately, today “titular status” as the major 
socio-political identifier, and also the 
criminological phenomenon, is not limited any 
more to a geographical position of this or that 
republic and is perceived by its holders as 
essential attribute and the privilege. Now this 
status is repeatedly strengthened by new 
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 Belozerov V., Op.cit., p. 186. 
54
 Op.cit., p. 187. 
55
 Op.cit., p. 211. 
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dimension – the radical Islam based on binary 
opposition “Muslims v. infidels”. 
Here it is important to note that Islam as a 
complicated religious system is not necessary to 
the most fanatical “titular” activists. They distort 
and emasculate the rich cultural and historical 
background of Islam to the level of the primitive 
Salafi doctrine of the military-political character 
aimed at achievement of destructive, tactical 
results56. Such ideology is the general religious 
and extremist dogma and an important condition 
of the ‘supra-ethnic’ unity which for the first time 
makes possible the steady consolidation of 
“titular” groups and further radicalization of the 
North Caucasus. Among radical Muslims in the 
North Caucasus self-identification as members of 
international ummah and fighters of Worldwide 
Jihad amplifies. And, anyway, they make part of 
accruing activity of religious extremism57. Thus, 
Islam from the neutral and general denominator of 
the Caucasian groups of the population (the so-
called “funeral Islam”) is intentionally distorted, 
adjusted to short-term objectives, becomes radical 
and turns into a dangerous point of assembly 
(“permanent jihad”) of the new consolidated 
underground. It became obvious during the 
Second Chechen campaign when researchers 
noted, “that some peoples of the North Caucasus 
developed a peculiar lifestyle, thinking, 
perception of reality in which Islam is shown as 
one of the main lines of self-identification 
                                                          
56
 Wilhelmsen J., When Separatists Become Islamists: 
the Case of Chechnya, FFI/Rapport–2004/00445, 
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Kjeller, 
2004, pp. 9–45. 
57
 Malashenko A., Kak vybirali v Chechne, Mosk. 
Тsentr Karnegi, Moskva, 2006, p. 30. 
(including group identification) and 
nationalism”58. 
Here it is worth stating the main signs of a 
phenomenon of the “titular status” which is 
setting the principles of definition of social reality 
for separate groups of the population:  
i. Cultivated feeling of ethnic and historical 
superiority and “presumption of 
rightness” in any social transactions, 
including conflict situations. 
ii. Mountainous version of male supremacy 
and ‘body politics’ as a traditional way of 
life59. 
iii. Primary following religious [“peoples’ 
Islam”, locally – Sharia60] or traditional 
[e.g. adat61] norms instead of official legal 
obligations. 
iv. Translation of negative objectives of 
parents through family upbringing. 
v. Socialization through criminal practice of 
consanguineal complicity. 
vi. Long-term experience of successful and 
unpunished discrimination of “not titular” 
                                                          
58
 Avksent'ev V., Babkin I., “Islam i natsional'nye 
konflikty na Severnom Kavkaze”, Ab Imperio, No. 2, 
2000, p. 203. 
59
 See in details: Karpov Iu. Iu., Dzhigit i volk: 
muzhskie soiuzy v sotsiokul'turnoi traditsii gortsev 
Kavkaza, Rossiiskaia akademiia nauk, Muzei 
antropologii i etnografii im. Petra Velikogo 
(Kunstkamera), Sankt Peterburg, 1996, pp. 7–148. 
60
 Official Sharia justice existed in the Northern 
Caucasus until 1927. See in details: Bobrovnikov V.O., 
Musul'mane Severnogo Kavkaza: obychai, pravo, 
nasilie (ocherki po istorii i etnografii prava Nagornogo 
Dagestana), Vost. lit., Moskva, 2002, pp. 217–261. 
61
 A term borrowed from Arabic ةَداع [habit, custom]. 
For centuries in certain Muslim societies of Northern 
Caucasus Arabic was used as a language of religion, 
law and power. See e.g. Kemper M., “An Island of 
Classical Arabic in the Caucasus: Dagestan”, In 
Companjen F., Marácz L., Versteegh L. (eds.), 
Exploring the Caucasus in the 21st Century. Essays on 
Culture, History and Politics in a Dynamic Context, 
Pallas Publications, Amsterdam, 2010, pp. 63–90. 
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(mainly Slavic or Christian) population in 
the USSR and RF. 
vii. Existence of the “ethnic” territory. 
viii. Pseudoscientific, political and publicistic 
legitimization of the “titular status” 
including consciousness of historical 
insults of “colonial oppression” and 
“deportation” (for separate groups of 
population)62. 
ix. Radical Islam (for Muslim groups of 
population)63. 
x. Neo-tribal or religious community as a 
basic social unit: teip (or parts of teip – 
gar, nekʺiy, tsа), tukhum, jamaat, vird and 
Diaspora. 
xi. Ethnic uniformity and inviolability of 
republican “elite”. 
 
The following factors help to keep “a permanent 
titular status” outside traditional areas of dwelling: 
i. Diasporic support – within the 
country and from abroad (long-
distance nationalism)64. 
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 Gadzhiev M.S., Kuznetsov V.A., Chechenov I.M., 
Istoriia v zerkale paranauki: Kritika sovremennoj 
etnotsentristskoi istoriografii Severnogo Kavkaza, IЕA 
RAN, Moskva, 2006. 
63
 Certain scholars and experts consider that radical 
Islamists can provoke religious war in the RF. See. 
e.g.: Silant'ev R., Noveishaia istoriia islama v Rossii, 
Algoritm, Moskva, 2007, pp. 470–96; Suleimanov 
Rais: “Vlasti Tatarstana navedut poriadok v respublike 
– shariatskii”, Al'manakh «Na voine», 27.11.2012. 
64
 On increased role of diaspora communities in violent 
intra-state conflicts see e.g. Demmers J., “Nationalism 
from Without: Theorizing the Role of Diasporas in 
Contemporary Conflict”, In Atabaki T., Mehendale S. 
(eds), Central Asia and the Caucasus: 
Transnationalism and Diaspora, Routledge, New 
York, 2005, pp. 10–20. On highly politicized activities 
of Circassian Diaspora see e.g. Grebennikov V., “Is 
Leviathan Back? Circassian Ethnic Mobilization after 
the 2012 Presidential Elections in Russia”, CEU 
Political Science Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2013, pp. 
234–256. 
ii. Use of the “contractual” authorities: 
from adjustment of “contact” with the 
local employee of police to lobbying 
in the Federal Parliament. 
iii. Passive, defeatist and often 
collaborative position of the local “not 
titular” people of Russia. 
iv. Actual colonization, including 
criminal and demographic of certain 
(non-Caucasian) regions/cities and 
monopolization of commercially 
favorable fields of activity. 
 
Thus, the “titular status” is possibly to define as 
the mobilizing form of affective group belonging 
based on a negative complex of cultural, 
ideological and educational practices, fixed in 
public consciousness, legislation and reproduced 
as a strategy of socio-political domination. 
Certainly that the most educated, urbanized and 
secular representatives of North Caucasian groups 
of the population, as a rule, do not share “titular” 
dogmas. Unfortunately, such citizens can not 
influence domestic policy in the republics 
therefore not only ordinary life, but also law-
enforcement practice in “titular” territorial 
subjects of the RF has sharply negative 
specifics65. 
 
6. Academic attempts to “respond”. 
But why the problem of “titular” territories did not 
receive close attention of the academic and expert 
                                                          
65
 See e.g. Albogachieva M., “Iz istorii bor'by s krovnoi 
mest'iu v Ingushetii”, Antropologicheskii Forum, No. 
4, 2011, pp. 3–21; Albogachieva M., “Osobennosti 
vzaimodeistviia rossiiskoi sudebno-pravovoi sistemy i 
traditsionnykh pravovykh institutov ingushkogo 
obshchestva (XIX—XXI vv.)”, In Karpov Iu.Iu. (ed.) 
Obshchestvo kak ob”ekt i sub”ekt vlasti. Ocherki 
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circles? The opinion of one of the most objective 
researchers of nationalism in Russia is 
characteristic: “Frequently those who speak and 
write about the Russian nationalism have been 
asked about why such attention is not paid to the 
nationalisms of ethnic minorities. Truly they are 
given disproportionately less attention”66. Further 
he claims that “regional separatism ceased to be a 
real aim long ago” and “nationalisms of minorities 
pose a minor influence on a way of development 
of the country”67. 
Formally it is true: firstly, it is much more 
favorable for the “titular” regions to be parts of 
Russia under conditions of generously donated 
subjects of federation. Secondly, visible signs of 
nationalism are not present: consigned to the past 
ethno-xenophobic slogans of the “titular” 
authorities, demonstrative formation of ethnic 
paramilitaries, fighting dances on city squares and 
other attributes of primitive nationalist 
movements. Republican “elites” realized long ago 
that the current legislation and ostentatious loyalty 
to the federal center allow them to operate and 
discriminate “not titular” population with real 
impunity. Here Immanuel Wallerstein’s 
comparison is applicable: “The object of racism is 
not to exclude people, much less to exterminate 
them. The object of racism is to keep people 
within the system, but as Untermenschen, who 
can then be exploited economically and used as 
political scapegoats”68. Repressive practices began 
                                                                                          
politicheskoi antropologii  Kavkaza, Peterburgskoe  
Vostokovedenie, Sankt Peterburg, 2012, pp. 142–208. 
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 Verkhovskii A., “Ideinaia evoliutsiia russkogo 
natsionalizma: 1990-e i 2000-e gody”, In Verkhi i nizy 
russkogo natsionalizma, Тsentr «Sova», Moskva, 2007, 
p. 7. 
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 Verkhovskii A., Op. cit., p. 8. 
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 Wallerstein I., “The Racist Albatross. Social Science, 
Jörg Haider and Widerstand”, Eurozine, 14.09.2000. 
to be used by default and turned into an integral 
part of a political landscape. Thus, beating of the 
North Caucasian person in Moscow causes a 
predictable resonance in mass media and public 
condemnation as a hate crime whereas murdering 
of the Russian family in Ingushetia receives 
muffled interpretation in mass media and the 
irritated response of the republican authorities. It 
is worth giving opinion of the M.P. of the RF V.I. 
Alksnis: “The other day the group of deputies of 
the State Duma, representatives of all fractions, 
left in official journey, and during this trip we had 
a meeting with one high-ranking head, will tell so, 
regional level. And here this person with tears in 
the eyes told us that he was compelled to leave the 
national republic where he was born only because 
there Russians are not appointed to higher 
positions. If someone tells that it is slander, – I do 
not want to call here the republic, but... It is the 
practice which has developed in Russia. If 
someone thinks that it does not promote kindling 
of national discord and hostility in Russia, these 
people are mistaken. I can imagine that the young 
man who for years observes deprivation of rights 
of his nation … He asks why family of his 
relatives was slaughtered in Chechnya and no 
criminal charges on this fact were brought? Why 
the murderers of this slaughtered Russian family 
were not punished? He asks why his friends had 
to run from Tajikistan and Moscow looks at this 
indifferently? He asks himself why even more 
often on the streets of his city he gets insulted by 
some ‘guests from mountains’? With radicalism 
peculiar to youth, having convinced that is useless 
to wait from the authorities that they will begin to 
pursue policy in interests of the majority of the 
people, he decides to restore social justice 
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independently, on his terms … And all this forced 
certain radicals to see the only way to change 
something – that is to revenge, having taken a 
baseball bat, the weapon or explosive materials”69. 
Such reaction in the form of protest extremism 
received definition of “the Russian nationalism”. 
But is it only such “nationalism” is worthy 
studying and condemning? Whether only crimes 
“majority v. minority” could be caused by hatred? 
And why administrative and political 
discrimination and direct exile of “not titular” 
population is considered normal, according to 
various researchers? For a long time there are all 
grounds to believe that “the constitutional 
nationalism” in “titular” territorial subjects of the 
RF is more dangerous both to society and to the 
state, than notorious “Russian 
nationalism/fascism”. After all even the North 
Caucasian scholar writes that: “This fascism is a 
pathological result of national humiliation of 
Russians, including the humiliation suffered by 
Russians in the Caucasian periphery… Possibly, 
not any other “colonial nation” in history 
happened to be so deprived, in comparison with 
the colonized natives as in situation Russians 
found themselves in the territory of the national 
republics of the North Caucasus”70.  
And what are the benefits of having these 
“national” republics within Russia? What is the 
price of keeping the “titular” territories as a part 
of the Russian state? Whether there is a way out 
from this inverted empire where remote ethnic 
regions colonize and exploit the federal center? 
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 Vystuplenie na zasedanii Gosudarstvennoi Dumy 
Rossii, 15.11.2006. Available at: 
http://www.akdi.ru/gd/PLEN_Z/2006/11/s15-11_u.htm      
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 Тsutsiev A., “Russkie i kavkaztsy: po tu storonu 
druzhby narodov”, Druzhba Narodov, No 10, 2005. 
What kind of opinions is offered by the academic 
science? 
Investigating a problem of “national” subjects, 
A.N. Malinkin considers that territorial subjects of 
the RF formed on an ethnic basis have to be 
liquidated with all their (artificial) borders and the 
quasi-feudal privileges stimulating formation of 
ethnocratic republican regimes71. In his opinion, 
withdrawal from the pseudo-federal state system 
which is based on ethnic federalism, and transition 
to originally democratic federalism allowing only 
administrative-territorial differentiations and 
guaranteeing the actual civil equality and 
observance of human rights is necessary72. 
However such a suggestion despite the visible 
argumentativeness does not take into 
consideration realities of modern Russia. In what 
way is it really possible to liquidate “ethnic” 
territorial subjects? Considering level and 
prevalence of the anti-Russian moods in these 
“titular” subjects such elimination will be 
impossible without consent of the local 
population. And this decision at all would not be 
peaceful. But even with a hypothetical agreement 
of “titular elites” to replace the status of their 
territorial subject from ‘republic’ with ‘region’ 
political ‘rebranding’ would not change 
administrative and ethnic balance in such 
extremely conflict region as Dagestan, religious 
and clannish character of the local authorities in 
Ingushetia, feudal and class stratification of 
society in Karachay-Cherkessia and anywhere 
would not eliminate deeply embedded traditions 
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 Malinkin A.N., “«Novaia rossiiskaia identichnost’»: 
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zhurnal, No 4, 2001. 
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of a “titular” superiority73. And whether 
“originally democratic federalism” is eventually 
possible given existing political system? 
Many practical scholars have learned by the 
experience the impossibility of such “liquidating 
reforms”. So, according to Nikolay Petrov, “many 
elements of political engineering, even seemingly 
easy gained, are absolutely irreversible. That is, if 
you created ethnic statehood, if you told that such 
ethnicity since now has any pseudo-statehood, it is 
almost impossible to take it back without blood, 
without disastrous conflicts. It is already 
unimportant further, whether there was once a 
history, – if it was not it is constructed. Already 
no matter how ethnically salient they are, how 
ethnically distant are these or those groups from 
their neighbors. If you made it you already started 
a certain mechanism which practically has no 
reverse motion. [e]thnic should never get attached 
with territorial. Because as soon as borderlines 
start, even if in heads of people, to get any ethnic 
content, instantly any most insignificant conflict 
can turn into inter-ethnic collision what we have 
witnessed in enormous quantity of cases in the 
territory of the former Soviet Union”74. N. Petrov 
is absolutely right and it is necessary to add only 
that “the mechanism which practically has no 
reverse motion”, nevertheless continues the 
progress, and the territories being outside the 
republics, promptly are exposed to the “titular 
Reconquista” by means of migration from the 
North Caucasus. 
                                                          
73
 Kazenin K., Еlementy Kavkaza: zemlia, vlast' i 
ideologiia v severokavkazskikh respublikakh, ID 
REGNUM, Moskva, 2012. 
74
 Petrov N., O regionalizme (Publichnaia lektsiia), 
Polit.Ru, Moskva, 9.02.2006  Available at: 
http://www.polit.ru/lectures/2006/02/13/petrov.html    
Therefore other scientists offer radical options of 
overcoming of this problem. So, the known 
Russian geographer Vladimir Kagansky 
reasonably considers that “from the point of view 
of the positive spatial analysis, it is always 
possible to specify the territories which existence 
as a part of the state brings harm for this state. 
What has to do the responsible state in these 
cases? It has to declare off these territories at any 
cost. And not to wait when these territories will 
want to separate. You perfectly understand that 
there are a number of territories75 which presence 
as a part of Russia is a burden. And what do we 
see? That the state tries to hold these very 
territories, which presence as a part of Russia is 
extremely harmful to it. The matter is that from 
history of the North Caucasus it is known: wars 
always take place there. The reason is not so clear 
to me: whether it is a civilization break, whether 
something else – wars always take place in this 
territory. The question is: did not Russia make a 
fatal mistake in the XIX century having annexed 
these territories? It did. What does it do now? It 
tries to repeat this fatal flaw. But at the same time 
we see a brilliant example of remarkable 
geographical engineering – abandonment of 
Alaska. It was that territory which was too costly 
to hold”76. This radical option offers counter-
separation – separation from burdensome 
territories and groups of the population 
corresponding to them77. But abandonment of 
                                                          
75
 Better say – the local population of these territories. 
76
 Kaganskii V., Neizvestnaia Rossiia (Publichnaia 
lektsiia), Polit.Ru, Moskva, 19.04.2007   Available at: 
http://polit.ru/article/2007/05/04/kaganskiy/ 
77
 Similar views are characteristic not only for modern 
Russia. In Italy since 1991 there is North League for 
the Independence of Padania – the political party 
demanding separation from “undeveloped and criminal 
South” with formation of the independent state with the 
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Alaska which had the dubious colonial status 
supported only with a few hundreds of Russian 
hunters, besides being on the other continent and 
possible separation from integrated, strategic part 
of the Russian territory have not much in 
common. The North Caucasus is the frontier 
macro-region with the population of 17 million 
people which is an integral part of the vital 
infrastructures of federal level: military and 
logistic, energy, industry, finance and economics, 
transport, education, public health, not to mention 
inclusiveness in uniformed cultural and linguistic 
space. Hundreds of thousands of Russian “not 
titular” citizens live in the Caucasus with no place 
to come in the post-Caucasian Russia. Unclear 
what arguments of legal character will form the 
basis for such a suggestion, after all ideas of this 
sort have to be supplemented with detailed 
constructive program. 
There is also some other doubts in correctness of a 
position of V. Kagansky. Will any Slavic enclaves 
remain in the North Caucasus? How to “exclude” 
Republic of Adygea which is territorially 
encircled by Krasnodar region? What will be 
reaction of ruling circles and the population of the 
mountainous republics and what will happen with 
                                                                                          
capital in Milan. Later, for better electoral appeal, the 
requirements were softened to the gradual 
federalization of the Italian state. It is remarkable that 
ideologists of North League are not limited to the 
arguments of populist and economic character, but also 
develop their own “political geography” and ethno-
cultural mythology. See e.g. Huysseune M., “Imagined 
Geographies: Political and Scientific Discourses on 
Italy's North-South Divide”, In Coppieters B., 
Huysseune M. (eds.),  Secession, History and the 
Social Sciences, VUB Brussels University Press, 
Waversesteenweg, 2002, pp. 207–26. Comparison of 
centrifugal regional tendencies in Italy and Belgium 
see in: Huysseune M. (ed.), Contemporary Centrifugal 
Regionalism: Comparing Flanders and Northern Italy, 
Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België voor 
Wetenschappen en Kunsten, Brussel, 2011. 
 
the numerous North Caucasian Diasporas which 
have been strongly fixed in the heartland of the 
Russian state? A final partition will logically 
require frontier arrangements which will demand 
huge funds on direct formation of the whole 
complex of infrastructure and not lesser sums of 
money for the inevitable corruption expenses: so-
called “kickbacks” to federal and local 
bureaucrats. And transparency of internal borders 
in the CIS makes such isolation a mere formality 
– in the conditions of boundary transparency even 
similarity of the protected perimeter (limes) will 
be impossible. And the more so it is unclear how 
to consider the question of citizenship: “titular” 
inhabitants are citizens of Russia, and deprivation 
of nationality is forbidden by the current 
legislation (item 3 of Art. 6 of the Constitution of 
the RF) and norms of international law. 
Meanwhile “disposal” of “titular” regions is 
possible only in case of state disintegration. But 
the situation when the federal authorities 
financially support the constitutional 
discrimination of “not titular” citizens is in any 
case inadmissible and allocates “titular” citizens 
with the exclusive status of subsidized form of 
exterritoriality. 
 
7. State’s aggressive professional impotence. 
Whether there is a probability of a social protest 
of the oppressed Russian population in the North 
Caucasus – a stigmatized community of “loosing 
and suffering”? Most likely, no: years of 
discrimination proved that people prefer flight to 
resistance. Leaders, the positive program and high 
level of consolidation of suspect group are 
necessary for fight. Thus it is necessary to 
consider that the discontent which has accepted 
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organized forms, was already presented in mass 
media as manifestation of “the Russian 
nationalism” and even fascism. If the direct 
protest is excluded, there is a need of the all-
Russian campaign in protection of the rights of 
“not titular” population. Unfortunately, this option 
too is unpromising as serious efforts of non-
governmental organizations (having absolutely 
other priority) are for this purpose necessary and 
continuous covering of events in mass media 
(now it partially occurs in “the black market of 
information” – in a blogosphere accessed by a few 
percent of the population of the RF)78.  While the 
problem of “the internal abroad” of Russia (and 
not only the North Caucasus, but also, for 
example, Republic of Tyva where the 
considerable part of the Russian population was 
expelled at the beginning and the middle of the 
1990-s) continues to be aggravated, creating new 
preconditions for reaction of protest extremism in 
regions and reproduction of hate culture in 
society.   
Reaction of the federal authorities continues to 
remain sporadic and declarative. Consider an 
example from the Dispatch of the President of 
Russia V. Putin of December 12, 2012 to the 
Federal Assembly: “We will not allow emergence 
of the closed ethnic enclaves in Russia with the 
                                                          
78
 On political exploitation of blogosphere see e.g.: 
Aday S. et al., Blogs and Bullets: New Media in 
Contentious Politics, United States Institute of Peace, 
Washington, August 2010. Analysis of Russian protest 
capacity managed online: Alexanyan K. et al., 
Exploring Russian Cyberspace: Digitally-Mediated 
Collective Action and the Networked Public Sphere, 
Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard 
University, Cambridge (MA), March 2012. Overview 
of extremist activity in social networks: Berger J.M., 
Strathearn B., Who Matters Online: Measuring 
Influence, Evaluating Content and Countering Violent 
Extremism in Online Social Networks, International 
informal jurisdiction, living out of uniform legal 
and cultural framework of the country, 
provocatively ignoring the standard norms, laws 
and rules”. The abovementioned enclaves in the 
form of the republics and Diasporic “branches” 
comfortably exist over twenty years out of a 
uniform legal and cultural framework of the 
country and with an accruing challenge ignore the 
standard norms, laws and rules enjoying at the 
same time systematic budgetary support from the 
federal center. It is doubtful to believe that the 
next presidential performance will cause cardinal 
change of current situation or at least will serve as 
a signal for revision of policy of “titular 
privileges” in the RF. On October 5, 2013 during 
XIV Congress of “United Russia” governmental 
political party prime-minister of the RF Dmitry 
Medvedev underlined that: “[w]e should not let 
ethnic enclaves to appear, especially in the 
cities”79. In other words it means that Russia got 
even more disunited since 2012.  
 
8. Conclusion. Russian prospects and 
European political risk management. 
It seems that the possible solution of 
abovementioned problems (again linked with 
terrorism as the end of 2013 has gruesomely 
proved) manifests itself not in the isolated 
regional approach80 but in the careful process of 
                                                                                          
Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political 
Violence, London, March 2013. 
79
 Stenogramma Sʺezda. Available at: 
http://er.ru/news/2013/10/6/xiv-sezd-partii-edinaya-
rossiya/  
80
 See e.g. Vassilieva O., “Conflict Management in the 
Caucasus via Development of Regional Identity”, In 
Koehler J., Zürcher C. (eds.), Potentials of Disorder: 
Explaining Conflict and Stability in the Caucasus and 
in the Former Yugoslavia, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 2003, pp. 174–192. 
Rivista di Criminologia, Vittimologia e Sicurezza – Vol. VIII – N. 2 – Maggio-Agosto 2014 63 
 
nation-building81 – taking into account North-
American and European experiences, rethinking 
traditional understanding of ethnicity82, migration 
and citizenship83. To begin with there is a need to 
grasp the initiative from extreme forces and start a 
public dialogue, bringing together the antagonists 
as it takes place in other countries84. The next step 
– is to revise the educational programs imbedding 
positive unification over shared symbols and 
ideals (if it is ever possible without strong 
common ideology or desired secular utopia). One 
of the most difficult and explosive tasks is to 
bring back the tradition of laïcité freeing society 
from explosive and opposing religious ideologies 
(first of all – to stop radical Islamist expansion85). 
Logically it is crucial to replace ethnic dimension 
from mass media and public consciousness with 
other forms of identity and representation. And it 
is very important to underline that because of the 
international obligations of the RF all these 
objectives have to be implemented liberally – 
according to the high standards of human rights so 
                                                          
81
 On persistent yet unsuccessful nation-building efforts 
in post-Soviet Russia see e.g. Shevel O., “Russian 
Nation-building from Yel'tsin to Medvedev: Ethnic, 
Civic or Purposefully Ambiguous?”, Europe-Asia 
Studies, No. 63 (2), 2011, pp. 179–202. 
82
 See e.g. Brubeiker R., Etnichnost' bez grupp, Izd. 
dom Vysshei shkoly ekonomiki, Moskva, 2012. 
83
 An attempt of such a holistic view: Malakhov V., 
Kul'turnye razlichiia i politicheskie granitsy v epokhu 
global'nykh migratsii, Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 
Institut filosofii RAN, Moskva, 2014. 
84
 See e.g.: Roleff T.L. (ed.), Hate Groups: Opposing 
Viewpoints, Greenhaven Press, San Diego, 1999. 
85
 Though RF is not a country with the dominant 
Muslim population the Russian government could learn 
some key lessons from the positive experience of de-
radicalization in various Muslim societies from Algeria 
to Malaysia: El-Said H., De-Radicalising Islamists: 
Programmes and their Impact in Muslim Majority 
States, International Centre for the Study of 
Radicalisation and Political Violence, London, January 
2012. 
strictly monitored by Western partners86. The last 
but not the least is the new conditions of nation-
building. Old instruments of XIX century might 
not work properly in the age of fading nation-
state, globalization, mass migrations and 
alternative discourses of influential non-state 
actors. 
It is hard to say whether the RF is capable to 
manage this heavily complicated task of political 
engineering combined with multi-leveled social 
constructivism given the fact of twenty-three 
years lost in transition and snowballing problems. 
One should also keep in mind the disastrous brain-
drain of nineties and general degradation of 
humanities in the country, including inertia of 
meanings, simulation of thought move and 
absence of independent scientific analysis. But if 
the government has desisted from attempts of 
solving these problems being preoccupied with 
organizing international sport events, political 
parties remain merely commercial entities and the 
third sector is invalid – who remains in the 
position of a (collective) ‘crisis manager’? Could 
it be an external actor? The answer is unclear but 
the time is short for the RF and the next decade 
will ultimately demonstrate either serious 
improving either a failing state with the violent 
disintegration of the country. Such a catastrophe 
will obviously affect not only post-Soviet 
republics so probably the EU in its political 
strategy towards the Russian Federation should 
take a closer look at this explosive situation 
directly facing European borders.  
                                                          
86
 On general contradictions between nation-building 
based on human rights and cultural peculiarities see 
e.g. Weston H.B., “Human Rights and Nation-Building 
in Cross-Cultural Settings”, Maine Law Review, Vol. 
60, No. 2, 2008, pp. 318–346. 
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Clearly, these concepts and suggestions need 
further development and improvement. This can 
only be done, nevertheless, with the help of 
serious interdisciplinary ‘titular’ studies 
conducted by criminologists, sociologists, 
political scientists, anthropologists, economists 
and balanced with reports of human rights 
activists. Hopefully, this article has provided some 
usable directions for this kind of research. 
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